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The miracle of the Septuagint and the promise of data mining in 
economics 
 
 
STAN DU PLESSIS
1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper argues that the sometimes-conflicting results of a modern revisionist literature on data mining in 
econometrics reflect different approaches to solving the central problem of model uncertainty in a science of 
non-experimental data. The literature has entered an exciting phase with theoretical development, methodological 
reflection,  considerable  technological  strides  on  the  computing  front  and  interesting  empirical  applications 
providing momentum  for  this  branch of  econometrics.  The  organising  principle  for  this  discussion  of  data 
mining  is  a  philosophical  spectrum  that  sorts  the  various  econometric  traditions  according  to  their 
epistemological assumptions (about the underlying data-generating-process DGP) starting with nihilism at one 
end and reaching claims of encompassing the DGP at the other end; call it the DGP-spectrum. In the course of 
exploring this spectrum the reader will encounter various Bayesian, specific-to-general (S-G) as well general-to-
specific (G-S) methods. To set the stage for this exploration the paper starts with a description of data mining, its 
potential risks and a short section on potential institutional safeguards to these problems. 
 
Keywords:  Data  mining,  model  selection,  automated  model  selection,  general  to  specific 
modelling, extreme bounds analysis, Bayesian model selection 
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1 Written for the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Economics and first presented at the University of Alabama in 
Birmingham during May 2006. I am grateful for the many helpful comments from the conference participants and for 
specific comments by Ben Smit. The usual disclaimer applies.   
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The miracle of the Septuagint and the promise of data mining in 
economics 
 
WHILE hard pressed in his second round with Tinbergen, Keynes played a trump: the Septuagint, he reminded 
Tinbergen, was produced by seventy translators working independently from the same Hebrew text and who 
emerged from their cells to find, miraculously, that they had produced seventy identical Greek translations of the 
Old  Testament.  And  so  the  Septuagint  was  held  to  carry  the  (considerable)  authority  of  independent 
confirmation. In modern econometric parlance the Septuagint might be called a robust translation – a believable 
text for the Greek world – or it might simply have been the truth. 
 
Turning on Tinbergen, Keynes now wondered: “Would the same miracle be vouchsafed if seventy multiple 
correlators were shut up with the same statistical material?” and how else might we distinguish econometrics 
from “statistical alchemy” (Keynes, 1940: 155-156)? It is a question that reveals unease with data mining: that 
rival and inconsistent models might proliferate, that design criteria might reveal the prejudices of the modeller not 
the  underlying  economic  structure,  that  parameter  estimates  might  be  biased  and  that  test  sizes  might  be 
misleading. In short, data mining could compromise the believability of econometric models.  
 
And yet there might not be an alternative to data mining if economics is going to be an empirical science 
practiced with the joint constraints of incomplete economic theory and non-experimental data. We need data to 
complement our otherwise inadequate theoretical models, but because economic data is only rarely experimental, 
that means repeated use of the same data. This leaves modern econometricians to steer, as David Hendry (1997) 
said,  between the  Scylla  of  theory-dependence  and  the  Charybdis  of  data-dependence
2.  Doing  so  with  data 
mining seems to offend against norms of good conduct in econometrics; or at least, such norms were widely 
shared until recent advances in the theory of econometric modelling (Backhouse and Morgan, 2000) and access to 
unprecedented computing capacity
3 had encouraged a revisionist literature in which the unhappy connotations of 
data  mining  have  yielded  to  the  view  that  data  mining  is  a  necessary  part  of  a  sensible  modelling  strategy 
(Granger, 1999; Hendry and Krolzig, 1999; Hoover and Perez, 1999; Phillips, 2005). Indeed, data mining may 
even be a virtue (Greene, 2000; Hoover and Perez, 2000). This paper considers these developments and their 
implications for data mining in econometrics.  
 
The organising principle for this discussion of data mining is a philosophical spectrum that sorts the various 
econometric traditions according to their epistemological assumptions (about the underlying data-generating-
process DGP) starting with nihilism at one and reaching claims of encompassing the DGP at the other end; call it 
the DGP-spectrum. In the course of exploring this spectrum the reader will encounter various Bayesian, specific-
to-general (S-G) as well general-to-specific (G-S) methods. To set the stage for this exploration the paper starts 
with  a  description  of  data  mining  and  its  potential  dangers  and  a  short  section  on  potential  institutional 
                                                       
2 Pagan (2003) uses the same tension between data-dependence and theory-dependence as an organising principle for his 
survey of modern macroeconometric modelling methods.  
3 The dramatic potential of modern computing power is transforming research in many fields (Glymour, 2004), and there is 
optimism that it will do the same for applied econometrics (Phillips, 2005).   
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safeguards to these problems.  
 
1. Shared experience 
 
Chris Chatfield uses the term  “data mining” to describe the situation where “… models are not fully specified a 
priori, but rather are formulated, at least partially, by looking at the same data as those later used to fit the model” 
(Chatfield,  1995:  426,  emphasis  in  the  original).  This  definition  highlights  the  same  features  emphasised  by 
Hoover and Perez (2000), that is: the use of data to describe and estimate models on the one hand and the use of 
the same data to evaluate models against certain design criteria.  
 
Both definitions emphasise the dual use of data and this runs like a thread through the various habits associated 
with data mining in econometric modelling (Chatfield, 1995; Mayo, 1996; White, 2000). Such dual use of data 
could  manifest  in  more  than  one  way,  including  (Spanos,  2000):  selecting  a  data  set  or  sample,  choosing 
regressors, the respecification of a model, diagnostic testing and visual inspection of the data (data snooping).  
 
The type data mining at stake in this paper is this approach to modelling characterised by the dual use of data, not 
that branch of statistics, also called “data mining”, that studies the use of modern computer algorithms to search 
for patterns in large databases. Such statistical data mining is not an attempt to uncover any underlying DGP 
(Hand, 1998). The boundary between this statistical study of local patterns in data and data mining as a tool of 
econometric modelling is not strict though, indeed econometrics at the nihilistic end of the spectrum introduced 
above overlaps to some extent with the statistical tradition of data mining.  
 
Data mining, at any point along the DGP spectrum, implies the repeated use of the same data. However, since so 
much economic data is non-experimental (also called observational data) the repeated use of economic data is 
difficult, or even impossible, to avoid (Spanos, 1995; White, 2000). “Econometrics”, so Schumpeter argued early 
on, “is nothing but the explicit recognition of this rather obvious fact” (Schumpeter, 1933: 6). 
 
The statistical considerations relevant to econometrics with non-experimental data are different from those of 
experimental  statistics  (Spanos,  1995;  Hand,  1998).  Indeed,  Spanos  has  argued  that  given  the  inevitably 
widespread use of non-experimental data in economics
4, it would be more sensible to locate econometrics in the 
biometric tradition of statistics than in the experimental design tradition (Spanos, 1995; 1999). An econometrician 
operating in the latter tradition respects what Spanos calls a predesignationist rule that requires a specification of the 
relevant hypothesis before examining the data (Spanos, 2000). In contrast the biometric tradition was explicitly 
developed for settings where such rules are irrelevant.  
                                                       
4 Schumpeter’s well-known claim for economics as the “most quantitative” of all sciences is based on the non-experimental 
nature of much economic data. In his words from the first edition of Econometrica “There is, however, one sense in which 
economics is the most quantitative, not only of ‘social’ or ‘moral’ sciences, but of all sciences, physics not excluded. For 
mass, velocity current, and the like can undoubtedly be measured, but in order to do so we must always invent a distinct 
process of measurement…Some of the most fundamental economic facts, on the contrary, already present themselves to our 
observation  as  quantities  made  numerical  by  life  itself.  They  carry  meaning  only  by  virtue  of  their  numerical 
character…Econometrics is nothing but the explicit recognition of this rather obvious fact, and the attempt to face the 
consequences of it” (Schumpeter, 1933: 5-6, emphasis in the original).  
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The observational nature of much economic data implies an unknown sampling model and this adds to model 
uncertainty born from incomplete theoretical models. Such model uncertainty manifests in a number of ways: the 
variables to be included, the functional and probabilistic form of the model and the choice between rival models 
(Chatfield, 1995). This challenge is particularly acute with small samples (Pagan and Veall, 2000), since White’s 
theorem guarantees the recovery of the true DGP from an over-parameterised initial model in large samples
5 
(White, 2005 [1990]).   
 
 
There is a widely held perception that data mining in the sense of a dual use of non-experimental data in the 
context of model uncertainty is widespread (Chatfield, 1995; Greene, 2000; Mayer, 2000; Pagan and Veall, 2000; 
White, 2000). Burger and du Plessis (2006) have quantified the extent of data mining in applied econometrics by 
evaluating the modelling strategies employed in a random sample of papers drawn from academic journals in 
economics published in 2003. From the 75 papers in their sample 71% used non-experimental data and 89% 
showed explicit evidence of an iterative modelling strategy, of which the dual use of data associated with data 
mining is a common form.  
 
For the remainder of this essay this combination of model uncertainty and observational data, which is associated 
with data mining  in practice, will be  treated  as  a shared  experience  for  applied econometrics.  While  all  the 
traditions considered here share this experience, they move beyond it with the guidance of different theories and 
techniques and in opposite directions.  
 
 
2. The risks of data mining 
 
The collection of research habits gathered under the heading of data mining has frequently furnished a stick with 
which to beat the econometric fraternity, and to cast doubt over the value of the considerable annual econometric 
output (for example, Leamer, 1978; Karni and Shapiro, 1980; Leamer, 1983; Lovell, 1983; Denton, 1985). It has 
also been used by proponents of specific econometric methods in their criticism of rival methods: Hendry (1997), 
for example, argued that Faust and Whiteman (1997a) had underplayed the “incipient ‘data mining’” in RBC (Real 
Business Cycle) and VAR (vector autoregression) methods, while Faust and Whiteman retorted that “…every 
LSE-style paper reports extensive theory-free tailoring of the model that overwhelms any such alterations made in 
the RBC literature” (Faust and Whiteman, 1997b: 192).  
 
A recent example by Sullivan, Timmerman and White (2001) show that these arguments are not just rhetorical. 
Instead, they are based on the real risk that data mining might undermine the statistical inference at the heart of 
applied econometrics. In an investigation of calendar effects on the stock market Sullivan et al. (2001) used a 
                                                       
5 This result is subject to the conditions mentioned in the discussion on the G-S method below. Absent these conditions 
Rissanen’s theorem may be applied to show that the DGP will not be recovered, even asymptotically (Phillips, 2003).   
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technique developed by White (2000) to evaluate the predictive power of different calendar-based trading rules, 
while accounting for the large number of potential rules amongst which the candidate rules would be selected.  
Their results were startling: while a number of individual calendar-effects were significant, none of these remained 
so once the extent of data mining that had accompanied their discovery was factored in using White’s “reality 
check”. 
 
Stepping  away  from  examples,  the  various  risks  posed  by  data  mining  could  be  divided  into  the  following 
categories (Spanos, 2000)
6: (i) data and sample selection; (ii) selection of regressors; (iii) respecification, and (iv) 
diagnostic testing. But these are only risks, and a framework is needed to understand when the risk is likely to lead 
to undesirable outcomes.  
 
To that end Spanos (2000) built on the econometric and philosophy of science literatures to derive a definition of 
“unwarranted” data mining.  The latter occurs when a researcher (i) interprets data as evidence in support of a 
proposition (or theory or hypothesis), having (ii) searched either over the data to establish such evidence or 
having searched for data supportive of the proposition, and while (iii) the proposition would fail a severe test on 
the same data. It is the combination of all three these aspects that causes mischief. This is the definition of 
unwarranted data mining used throughout this paper.  
 
The specification searches (within and across data sets) mentioned by Spanos (2000) does not itself present a 
insurmountable problem to the careful econometrician (Spanos, 2000: 235). The various traditions discussed in 
sections 4 through 6 are so many different ways of using such searches without – so their proponents claim – 
incurring the risks of unwarranted data mining. These traditions are often proponents of specific modelling 
strategies, and this is not by accident: a consequence of model uncertainty is that the modeller has no choice but 
to actively engage in model specification, which entails: formulating the model, estimating relevant parameters 
and evaluating the model all of which occurs in an “iterative and interactive way” (Chatfield, 1995: 425). But these 
“iterative and interactive” steps have to taken with a watchful eye on the risks that are briefly explored in the 
following few paragraphs.  
 
2.1 Searching for regressors 
The shared experience behind this discussion of data mining is the combination of model uncertainty and non-
experimental data. The risks posed by “searching for regressors” are closely related to model uncertainty while the 
non-experimental nature of the data moves to the fore in the discussion of  “data and sample selection” below. 
Due  to  model  uncertainty,  econometricians  usually  have  considerable  leeway  in  the  choice  of  variables,  the 
combinations of variables to be included and the functional form of any estimable model.  
 
The risk of unwarranted data mining looms large in this case, especially when the following iterative strategy is 
followed: select combinations of potential explanatory factors iteratively until the coefficients of the model are 
statistically significant at a conventional level (such as 5%). In what has become a famous paper Lovell (1983) 
used a Monte Carlo simulation to show that the probability of type I errors are much larger in such an iterative 
                                                       
6 For alternative discussions along the same lines see Leamer (1978) and Chatfield (1995).  
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process than the conventional 1% or 5% level of the final test.  
 
For example, in the simple case where an econometrician had been searching for the “best” two regressors out of 
ten potential regressors – not an unusually large number for the empirical growth literature, e.g. Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) – in a simulation where the true DGP had precisely two regressors, Lovell found that the true significance 
level of a t-test with 5% nominal size was, in his simulation, a much higher 22.6% (Lovell, 1983: table 1).  
 
In this example the statistical tests conducted after a dual use of the data were no longer “severe” tests. There is a 
long literature in economics that explores estimation bias and implied changes to the size of tests from similar 
dual use of the data (Wallace and Ashar, 1972; Denton, 1985; Giles and Giles, 1993; Chatfield, 1995; Granger et 
al., 1995; Spanos, 1995). Perhaps Leamer has articulated their collective concern most forcefully:  
 
“This searching for a model is often well intentioned, but there can be no doubt that such a specification 
search  invalidates  the  traditional  theories  of  inference.  The  concepts  of  unbiasedness,  consistency, 
efficiency, maximum-likelihood estimation, in fact, all the concepts of traditional theory, utterly lose their 
meaning by the time an applied researcher pulls from the bramble of computer output the one thorn of a 
model he likes best, the one he chooses to portray as a rose” (Leamer, 1983: 36-37). 
 
The various biases caused by data mining increases the likelihood that the final specification will show spurious 
relationships, instead of uncovering true effects. This fear of spurious correlation is a prime reason for the 
professional suspicion of data mining in econometrics (Hoover and Perez, 2000).  
 
In response to this risk one might follow Lovell’s (1983) early recommendation that authors be required to state 
explicitly the extent of the search they conducted and to adjust the sizes of tests accordingly. Statisticians like 
Chatfield  (1995)  have  argued  along  similar  lines  that  the  statistical  report  on  parameter  estimates  remains 
incomplete until the model selection strategy is taken into account. 
 
This recommendation is elaborated on below (in section 4) but as an empirical matter there is little evidence that 
it  has  had  much  impact  on  applied  econometrics.  Of  the  67  papers  that  showed  evidence  of  an  iterative 
modelling strategy in Burger and du Plessis (2006), just three papers gave an indication of the extent of iterations 
involved and only one of these allowed the extent of the iterations to influence the statistical inference. Further, 
the data mining of any one researcher working in a field of researchers represents only a fraction of the total 
number of searches
7 (Denton, 1985). In such circumstances the appropriate adjustment to test sizes requires 
information about search paths in the entire literature. Uncovering such information is likely to run into severe 
difficulties given, inter alia, the observed reluctance of authors to publish an indication of their model searches 
(mentioned above).  
 
                                                       
7 For Denton (1985) it is a fallacy of composition to argue that the risks of data mining would be diminished if everybody 
avoided data mining in their own research.   
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2.2 Data and sample selection 
A second variant of data mining is the iterative search for a data set. Such a search risks becoming unwarranted 
data mining when the modeller is willing to search over alternative data sets (differing in: sample period; or 
nature,  i.e.  panel,  cross-section  or  time  series;  frequency;  or  even  different  empirical  measures  of  the  same 
theoretical construct
8) until the data yields an estimated model consistent with her theoretical priors.  
 
This  variant  of  data  mining  is  unwarranted  when  the  final  model  is  offered  as  support  for  a  theoretical 
proposition after an iterative data search that constructed in order to confirm the theoretical proposition. The 
probability of a type II error is large in this case, as an estimated model contradicting the theoretical proposition 
is easily interpreted as evidence against the data, rather than evidence against the theory (Spanos, 2000).  
 
The use of “new data” is often mentioned as a potential safeguard against this variant of data mining (as it also 
believed to be against other variants of data mining) (for example, Granger, 1999; Greene, 2000). “New data” 
might mean a new sample of the same population, or cross validation in cross-section data or post-estimation 
(hold-out) samples in time series or a pure ex ante forecast. The hope is that new data would offer severe tests of 
the theoretical proposition at stake by introducing an element of objectivity in econometric modelling
9.  
 
It is especially for this reason that an ex ante forecast is sometimes thought to be the “gold standard” of model 
evaluation (Clements and Hendry, 2005). However, Clements and Hendry (2005) have recently argued that this 
exaggerates the role that forecast performance can play in econometric the model evaluation (see also, O'Hagen, 
1995; Sugden, 1995). Their reasoning is based on eight dichotomies which, when taken together, undermines the 
view that forecast performance is a (or the) key test in model evaluation.  
 
The dichotomies are: unconditional versus conditional models; internal versus external standards for forecast 
evaluation; checking constancy versus adventitious significance; ex ante versus ex post evaluation; one-step versus 
multi-step forecasts; fixed coefficients versus updating; stationarity versus non-stationarity and, finally, forecasting 
versus other objectives (Clements and Hendry, 2005).  While this is not the place to discuss the details of these 
dichotomies here their collective impact is to undermine the (sometimes exaggerated) role given to a specific 
forecast performance in the process of model evaluation. An economist has to evaluate her project carefully with 
respect to all eight of these dichotomies before making strong claims for the ability of an ex ante forecast to judge 
an econometric model.  
 
It is possible to add an empirical observation to Clements and Hendry’s (2005) theoretical caution, that is: new 
                                                       
8 For example, searching over the various proxies for “institutional quality” to identify an institutional effect in a growth 
regression.   
9 The objectivity of econometrics, as with other scientific activities depends inter alia on the inter-subjective testability of the 
models. All econometricians, like all other scientists are individually subjective in their treatment of theories and data, and the 
objectivity  of  the  scientific  exercise  emerges,  if  at  all,  through  the  inter-subjective  testing  of  these  models  by  other 
econometricians  and  especially  on  new  data  (Popper,  1992  [1961];  2000  [1959]).  The  physicists  Feynman  (1998:  18) 
acknowledges  a  “number  of  special  techniques  associated  with  the  game  of  making  observations”  not  unfamiliar  to 
economists concerned with data mining, and then he come to the same conclusion as Popper (2000 [1959]), i.e. that the 
objectivity of data is only to be found in repeated testing, and not only by yourself. 
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data is but little used to safeguard econometric models from unwarranted data mining. Burger and du Plessis 
(2006) found only 6 papers that used “new data” as a part of the model evaluation amongst the 75 papers 
examined by them. 
 
2.3 Respecification 
Unwarranted data mining might also occur for a third reason, i.e. the ad hoc adjustment of, say, the functional 
form of models in response to unfavourable output from statistical tests. In this way the modeller uses the 
unfavourable statistical output inductively to respecify the model in such a way that, given the data, the same test 
is passed by the respecified model. It follows that the probability of passing this test with the respecified model is 
very high. But, by the same token the severity of the test would have been greatly reduced (Spanos, 2000).  
 
Popper (2000 [1959]) had earlier argued that such ad hoc adjustments reduced the “empirical content” of a theory, 
where he defined the latter as the “class of potential falsifiers”. He argued that any hypothesis could always be 
“immunised” against falsification by finite observations through the use of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses. Popper 
proposed a methodological rule to avoid the unwarranted data mining implicit in such a strategy, i.e. that auxiliary 
hypotheses should increase, not decrease, the testability of the theory in question (Popper, 2000 [1959]). 
 
The  dynamic  specification  of  time  series  models  has  frequently  served  as  a  demonstration  of  this  risk  in 
econometrics. An estimated macroeconomic time series model often shows evidence of residual autocorrelation, 
perhaps detected by the Durbin-Watson statistic. It is an easy step – though a non-sequitur – from this evidence to 
the conclusion that the stochastic error of the underlying DGP has an autocorrelated structure. A respecified 
model that “corrects” for this suspected autocorrelated error structure “solves” the problem of autocorrelated 
residuals, even when no such structure exists for the DGP. 
 
This  is  the  danger  of  unwarranted  data  mining  by  respecification:  the  modeller  shoots  the  messenger  by 
eliminating the information content of statistical tests that were meant to warn her that the estimated model 
conflicted with the data (Hendry, 1980; Spanos, 1986; Hendry, 1995). Elsewhere, Hendry expressed the danger as 
follows: 
 
“[ad hoc respecification] ensures that it [the model] matches where it touches – but otherwise leads to 
invalid  inference…a  revision  process  of  gradually  expanding  a  model  and  stopping  at  the  first 
insignificant  improvement  maximises  the  initial  contamination  and  hence  the  likelihood  of  false 
inferences” (Hendry, 2000 [1985]: 275) . 
 
2.4 Diagnostic testing 
Unwarranted data mining compromises not just estimation, but model evaluation too. Due to model uncertainty 
and the subsequent dual use of data, econometrics requires a discipline of post-estimation model evaluation. But 
this  discipline  is  poorly  developed,  as  Clive  Granger  (1999)  has  lamented,  with  applied  econometrics  often 
reflecting greater concern with model inputs (for example, the estimation procedure) than with model outputs 
(for example, forecasts on new data). 
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Diagnostic testing is only infrequently an important criterion in model selection (Krämer et al., 1985)
10, and 
Kennedy (2003) has offered some reasons for the observed scepticism towards diagnostic testing, including: that 
their validity depends on the validity of the estimated model and that a series of such tests affects the sizes of 
these tests. These problems are not insurmountable and the G-S approach (discussed below) has a long literature 
showing that the conditions required for informative diagnostic testing are crucial elements in a progressive 
modelling strategy
11.  
 
In short G-S authors allow that the validity of diagnostic tests depend on the validity of the estimated model. To 
establish the latter we need to draw a distinction between testing primary hypotheses on the one hand and mis-
specification tests, on the other. The latter are Fisher tests, i.e. tests “‘without’ the boundaries of the postulated 
model”, while primary hypotheses are estimated “within” the bounds of a postulated model (Spanos, 2000: 257).  
 
The extensive use of the mis-specification tests is a critical part of the G-S strategy in the service of the explicit 
goal of finding a statistically adequate general model
12. However, the battery of misspecification tests is always a 
once-off  occurrence  for  a  newly  proposed  general  model,  so  that  there  is  no  risk  of  reduced  test  size  in 
establishing the statistical adequacy of the general model (Campos et al., 2005b). The G-S approach, with its 
emphasis on the destructive role of misspecification tests avoids unwarranted data mining from such tests, but 
this result depends critically on the G-S goal of locating a statistically adequate model, which is congruent with 
the local DGP (Hendry, 1995)
13. The other formal responses to data mining discussed below do not share this 
goal, and are, as a consequence, more circumspect about the potential safeguard from unwarranted data mining 
offered by these tests.  
 
In summary, unwarranted data mining risks undermining applied econometrics in a number of ways: it risks 
compromising the foundations of the associated statistical inference especially by reducing the severity of tests. In 
their recent reflection on data mining Hoover and Perez (2000) suggested three possible attitudes towards the 
reality of data mining: first, don’t do it, but if you must, then adjust the tests accordingly. Second, you can’t avoid 
data mining, hence you should investigate and (somehow) report al possible model specifications. Thirdly, data 
mining is an essential part of reasonable econometrics, but needs to be implemented in the right way.  
 
From the implicit data mining present in any examination of existing theories or existing data – (Denton, 1985; 
Greene, 2000) – and the empirical investigation in Burger and du Plessis (2006) it is evident that the first response 
considered by Hoover and Perez (2000) is little practiced. This leaves the second and third attitude to explore, but 
before turning to the various methodological responses entailed by those two attitudes, we take a short detour to 
                                                       
10  Krämer  et  al.  (1985)  found  that  an  overwhelming  proportion  of  published  models  in  their  sample  failed  standard 
diagnostic tests.  
11 Hendry defines a “progressive modelling strategy” as one where successive models account at least for the information in 
existing models, i.e. the new model encompasses the existing models (Hendry, 2000 [1985]).  
12 See, for example, Hendry’s three golden rules for econometrics “test, test and test” (Hendry, 1980). 
13 The modeller only proceeds with the testing of primary hypotheses once the statistical adequacy of the general model has 
been established in the G-S approach. Such hypotheses take the form of restrictions on the general model and the inference 
is supported by the statistical adequacy of the general model (Spanos, 1999).  
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consider possible institutional features, incentives and disincentives, that might affect the risk of unwarranted data 
mining.  
 
3. Institutional considerations 
 
The  catalogue  of  risks  associated  with  unwarranted  data  mining  adds  force  to  normative  campaigns  for 
appropriate reform to econometric method and practice. Nevertheless, and as Pagan and Veall (2000) recently 
observed, data  mining  remains ubiquitous despite  decades  of  unease.  Such  persistence in  the face of moral 
disapproval might encourage economists to investigate the positive causes of widespread data mining.  
 
Following Pagan and Veall (2000)one could either argue that economists have revealed a preference for data 
mining or that data mining is a market outcome in the decentralised market for scholarly research and publication 
(Pagan and Veall, 2000). Both interpretations open the way to an analysis of the incentive structure that supports 
data mining; that is, consideration of the formal and information institutions of applied econometric research.  
 
While such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the role that these institutions could play as a safeguard 
against unwarranted data mining is not. Editors, as intermediaries between the producers and consumers of 
econometrics, have the opportunity to impose standards that might facilitate the competitive evaluation of papers 
(Pagan and Veall, 2000).  To the extent that data is made available to referees, and the journal’s audience, the 
direct feedback effect and the indirect feedback effect through reputation effect could contribute strengthen 
safeguards  against  unwarranted  data  mining.  Important  results  (especially  with  policy  implications)  might 
eventually be subjected to further tests, possibly by rival economists. In this way the passage of time (which 
creates new un-mined data) and the participation by rival researchers is likely to uncover fragile results.  
 
The incentives created by editorial policies could also counter or nurture such critical evaluation of published 
work. For example, Denton (1985) warned of a “publication filter” whereby editors look more favourably on 
papers  that  report  “significant”  econometric  results.  Such  a  filter  does  not  need  formal  or  even  informal 
enforcement by editors, as self-selection by potential authors who mine their models until they are able to report 
significant results, would achieve the same result (see also, Mayer, 2000).  
 
McCloskey  and  Ziliak  recently  updated  their  earlier  study  of  applied  econometric  papers  published  in  the 
American Economic Review during the eighties (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996) with a similar study for the nineties 
(Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004). Their results suggest that Denton’s “publication filter” might be more than a 
theoretical possibility even in leading journals: they found that no less than three quarters of the papers published 
during  the  nineties used statistical significance  as a sole  criterion for the inclusion  of a variable (Ziliak  and 
McCloskey, 2004: Table 1). Give such a standard it is easy to see why an author might “self-select” not to submit 
a paper with insignificant coefficients.  
 
Regrettably,  the  “publication  filter”  is  not  the  only  disincentive  for  evaluative  work  that  might  detect  and  
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discourage unwarranted data mining: there are few career rewards for such work, and, embarking on a replication 
might be read as a sign of sterile imagination by colleagues. Worse still, an attempted replication might then be 
viewed as a personal attack. Finally, repetition is hard, especially since the original data set and statistical algorithm 
is often hard to mimic
14 (Dewald et al., 1986).   
 
In biology, a science where observational data is also regularly used in empirical investigations, it has long been 
recognised that such data places an extra burden on scientists to avoid misleading results. As the first editor of 
Biometrika, Francis Galton urged the distribution of data sets with papers, where practical, and the creation of a 
databank where such data may be accessed for critical reworking (Galton, 1901). Ragnar Frisch matched Galton’s 
sentiments when he announced, in the first edition, that Econometrica would, normally, publish “raw data” with 
applied papers to “stimulate criticism, control and further studies” (Frisch, 1933: 3). 
 
While Econometrica has not, in the main, found it useful to implement the policy envisaged by Frisch, the Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking launched the Data Storage and Evaluation Project in 1982 to facilitate the evaluation of 
econometric results
15. But even there Dewald, Thursby and Anderson (1986) found it remarkably difficult to 
replicate published results, often due to errors, but also because data and programmes had not in fact been 
stored.  
 
The optimistic perspective of Pagan and Veall (2000) on the ability of replication and criticism in journals to 
expose and discourage unwarranted data mining should therefore be tempered with two observations: replication 
is difficult in economics and the incentives for such research may be weak. As a consequence, replication remains 
scarce and refutations scarcer still (for example, Greene, 2000).  
 
Aris Spanos once claimed that he knew of no “economic theory that was ever abandoned because it was rejected 
by some empirical econometric test, nor was a clear-cut decision between competing theories made in lieu of the 
evidence of such a test” (Spanos, 1986: 660) and Lawrence Summers asked his readers to identify even a single 
“meaningful hypothesis about economic behaviour that has fallen into disrepute because of a formal statistical 
test” (Summers, 1991: 130). Because Summer’s challenge came with no incentive to respond, Keuzenkamp and 
Magnus (1995) offered a prize
16 to any reader that was able to offer evidence to disprove Spanos and Summers; 
nobody won the prize. 
 
Such claims are anecdotal though, and counter-anecdotes exist: Baumol’s (1986) case for (an absolute version of) 
the convergence hypothesis suffered what appears to have been a conclusive refutation at the hands of DeLong 
(1988). Pagan and Veall (2000) offered further examples to strengthen their claim that the important hypotheses 
                                                       
14 Dewald et al. (1986) found many authors unable to replicate their own results, notably where data or algorithms had been 
lost or where a research assistant was no longer at hand to explain her earlier work. In a group of 62 authors in their study, 
Dewald et al. (1986) found that only 22 provided the requested data and algorithms, while 20 made no reply and the 
remaining replied that they were unable to comply.  
15 The Journal of Applied Econometrics and the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics have taken similar initiatives (Pagan and 
Veall, 2000).  
16 The prize was an all-expenses paid week-long trip to the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg university.  
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in economics are examined with vigour and sometimes overturned, such as one important claim by Alesina and 
the same sceptical Summers17.  
 
Notwithstanding,  there  are  few  strong  incentives  and  many  practical  hurdles  for  replication  in  applied 
econometrics. It is not surprising that the supply of such papers is modest, making it hard to have confidence that 
the critical discussion in economics will provide a strong safeguard against unwarranted data mining. Happily 
recent developments in the theory and practice of econometric modelling might offer additional safeguards.  
 
4. Developments in the theory of econometric modelling 
 
The four recent econometric responses to the challenge of data mining considered in this section move beyond a 
defence of prevailing practice, to build cases for progressive reform; progressive, because these are not calls for a 
return to stricter rules to avoid data mining. These are examples of the second and third response suggested by 
Hoover and Perez (2000), according to which data mining is seen as a crucial (or at least an inevitable) part of a 
sensible  modelling  strategy  that  uses  the  vast  computing  power  offered  by  modern  information  technology 
(Hand, 1998).  
 
All four modern responses start from the shared experience mentioned above: that econometricians grapple with 
model uncertainty and usually with non-experimental data. However, the direction an econometrician takes from 
this shared experience depends on how she conceptualises the goal of econometric modelling. Specifically, the 
different positive approaches  to data  mining move  apart  from  the shared experience in  pursuit of different 
ontological and epistemological visions of the underlying data generating process (DGP).  
 
Three of these are inductive strategies, the first of which is built on a radical ontology that rejects the very 
concept of a DGP (section 4.1). The differences between the other three strategies are epistemological, not 
ontological, with disagreement on the ability of the modelling process to discover the DGP. The DGP moves 
from the periphery to the centre of the modelling exercise in the final response (section 4.4). In that approach the 
objective is to uncover the (local) DGP and the beneficent data mining exercise proceeds deductively from a 
statistical  model  that  the  econometrician  claims  to  be  a  valid  reduction  of  the  (local)  DGP18.  This  section 
considers these strategies in turn, and moving along the DGP spectrum (introduced above) from the nihilistic 
extreme to the opposite extreme and the goal of encompassing the (local) DGP.  
 
4.1 A first inductive response: robust talk 
Data mining poses not only a risk to the formal qualities of statistical inference in econometrics, but as a result 
thereof, also compromises the believability of particular models from the perspective of their consumers: other 
economists, policy makers and the broader public. Since the econometrician is uncertain about the appropriate 
                                                       
17 Pagan and Veall and referring to Alesina and Summer’s claim that central bank credibility would lower the sacrifice ratio 
for monetary policy (Pagan and Veall, 2000). 
18 Pagan and Veall have elsewhere asked whether the emphasis on the centrality of the DGP in the G-S approach implies 
that “other approaches do not have a similar aim” (Pagan and Veall, 2000: 214)? This paper answers Pagan and Veall in the 
affirmative.   
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model and has to discover the latter with observational data, the incentive for an applied econometrician who 
intends to persuade her clients of a model’s veracity, is to select one (or a few) preferred estimation(s) iteratively 
and only to report these. More especially, the many specifications that yield results in conflict with the preferred 
model go unreported.  
 
These incentives are understood by the customers of econometrics too – or so argued inter alia Cooley and LeRoy 
(1981), Leamer (1983) and, more recently, Mayer (2000) – and these customers are correctly sceptical of applied 
econometric  output;  a  strategic  setting  Cooley  and  LeRoy  (1981:  826)  described  as  “…nearly  a  zero-
communication information equilibrium. The researcher has the motive and opportunity to represent his results 
selectively, and the reader, knowing this, imputes a low or zero signal-to-noise ratio to the reported results”. Their 
claim was followed by Leamer’s emphatic assertion that “[h]ardly anyone takes data analysis seriously. Or perhaps 
more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone’s else’s data analysis seriously” (Leamer, 1983: 37). At stake is the 
quality  of  the  scientific  discussion  in  applied  economics  and  not  so  long  ago  Peter  Phillips  saw  a  “..huge 
credibility gap that exists between economic theory, empirical evidence and policy prescriptions” (Phillips, 1988: 
357).  
 
This risk to the scientific discussion in economics is not simply theoretical, as survey evidence suggest that a large 
proportion  of  economists  are  sceptical  of  econometric  output19.  The  first  class  of  formal  responses  to  the 
challenge  of  data  mining  discussed  here  is  attempt  to  shift  econometrics  out  of  this  “zero-communication 
information equilibrium”, i.e. to improve the quality of scientific debate.   
 
The recommendations in this class are so many attempts to remove the potentially deceptive aspects that might 
undermine applied econometrics. Mayer (2000: 186), for example,  sketches an “idealized – and simplified – 
picture of science” in which different econometricians investigating the same hypothesis with the same data, 
would  emerge,  in  the  manner  of  the  legendary  translators  of  the  Septuagint,  with  the  same  model.  The 
proliferation of models, and the doubtful power of applied models to conclusively reject empirical hypotheses in 
economics, show that this idealisation does not obtain in economics. For this reason Mayer (2000) chooses to 
depict data mining as a communications problem and his proposed remedy is to encourage authors to report 
more than just the final specification, especially that they report specifications that conflict with the final model, 
as such information would be valuable to the reader.  
 
Edward Leamer agrees with Mayer that data mining undermines the “atmosphere of econometric discourse” 
(Leamer, 1983: 43).]. In a hierarchy of statements starting with “truth” at the top, followed by “facts”, “opinions” 
and “conventions” at the bottom, Leamer (1983) argues that we rarely reach as high as “facts” and never in 
econometric modelling. We bring our opinions to the modelling exercise in econometrics, argued Leamer in this 
severe interpretation of model uncertainty, and these opinions are “whimsical”. Consequently the consumers of 
econometric output have no confidence in any particular estimated model.  
 
                                                       
19 Mayer (1995) cited a survey that found 27% of economists were “quite sceptical” of econometric output published in 
journals with another 2% comprehensively sceptical and 56% “somewhat sceptical”.   
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Since whimsical results fail to convince either economists or the public, Leamer argued, the focus in econometrics 
had to shift to producing more “robust” results, i.e. results that do not depend on a narrow range of opinions. 
And  to  that  end  Leamer  (1983)  recommended  that  the  econometrician  calculate  the  implications  of  many 
different possible models and then to report the “extreme estimates” of the estimates for particular variables, the 
width of which will indicate the fragility of inference based on individual models from the class considered. If we 
took our model uncertainty more seriously, as Leamer (1983) argued, we would uncover how fragile most of our 
estimates are, and the humble and transparent communication of these fragile results would clear the air that has 
been darkened by data mining. 
 
Leamer recognises the shared experience of model uncertainty and non-experimental data identified above. But 
he combines this with a radical view of the purpose of econometric modelling, in which he rejects any attempt to 
uncover the underlying DGP. He argues that we do not know the underlying data generating mechanism, we will 
not discover it en route with our modelling, nor is it even useful to assume that such a thing as the “true” DGP 
exists (Leamer, 1983: 36-38). Woodward (2006) has recently argued that such a “radical subjectivism” about the 
DGP is necessary for the extreme-bounds approach to offer an attractive modelling strategy20.  
 
This emphasis on robust correlates with the goal of improving communication follows an inductive argument, 
but it avoids running into the logical problems associated with induction by the very modesty of the goals:  the 
underlying idea is to update the economist’s (possibly whimsical) priors about the issue at hand by learning from 
the data.  
 
Levine  and  Renelt  (1992)  implemented  Leamer’s  strategy  on  one  of  the  most  heavily  mined  data  sets  in 
macroeconomics, the cross section data used in the empirical growth literature. They found, however, that very 
few of the usual suspects in the literature are “robust” correlates of cross-country growth.  
 
However, Levine and Renelt (1992) made no allowance for the quality of the models that are investigated; all of 
which  were  treated  equally,  as  so  many  opinions.  Building  on  their  result,  Sala-i-Martin  (1997)  suggested 
considering the whole distribution (across rival models) of a parameter by calculating the weighted average of the 
estimated parameter values and of their variances, across all possible models in which it occurs21. He then ran 2 
million regressions to cover his conception of all the possible permutations of the possible growth regression. In 
this way he was able to identify 22 apparently robust variables.  
  
More  recently,  and  working  with  Doppelhofer  and  Miller,  he  used  a  technique  midway  between  the  OLS 
estimates of the 2 million regressions and a fully Bayesian Model Averaging (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). The 
                                                       
20 Woodward (2006) distinguishes “inferential” robustness (in the Leamer sense) from other potentially relevant concepts of 
robustness,  such  as  measurement  robustness,  derivational  robustness  and  causal  robustness.  Hoover  and  Perez  (2004) 
showed in practice what Woodward (2006) showed in principle, i.e. that extreme bounds analysis is likely to overstate the 
“fragility” of econometric results. What is more, a correct model of the DGP is not expected to be inferentially robust 
against alternative specifications (Pagan and Veall, 2000; Hoover and Perez, 2004).  
21 The weights are proportional to the likelihoods of the separate models, i.e. models with higher likelihood receive a greater 
weight.   
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assumptions about the DGP remains as agnostic as before, but they are able to report that: “When we examine 
the cross-country data usually used by growth empiricists using BACE, we find striking and surprisingly clear 
conclusions” (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004: 815). They found 18 significant correlates with economic growth out of a 
potential 67  and their  emphasis  remains  on  clarity of  communication,  without  making  any  claim  about  the 
underlying DGP. 
 
The modesty of their claim is perhaps clearly demonstrated by considering those variables identified as robust 
correlates of growth in both Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). Of the 18 robust correlates in 
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) 3 had been assumed robust in Sala-i-Martin (1997), i.e. the level of initial income, life 
expectancy at the start of the period and primary school enrolment at the start of the period. Only 8 other 
variables were identified as robust by both studies, they were 3 dummy variables (Spanish colony, Latin America 
dummy, and Sub-Saharan Africa dummy), 3  religion fractions  (fraction Confucian, fraction Muslim, fraction 
Buddhist) and 2 other variables (fraction of gdp in mining and the number of years as an “open” economy). This 
set is doubtless easy to communicate, but makes no attempt at uncovering anything that might be thought of as 
“causes”, in the way that, for example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have done. But this is not a telling criticism 
against a radically subjectivist approach that aims only at improving the communication of econometric results in 
the face of the extensive data mining that is likely to result from model uncertainty and non-experimental data.  
 
4.2. A Second inductive response: The “Reality Check” and RETINA 
 
Halbert White (2000) has been concerned with data mining in econometric models designed for forecasting, and 
has offered a rigorous test to reduce the risk of confusing skill and luck in such models. Specifically his test is for 
the null hypothesis that the best model selected by the chosen method does not outperform a given forecasting 
benchmark model; he calls this test the “Reality Check” (White, 2000).  
 
As stated,  the  DGP  plays little role in White’s Reality  Check,  but the  DGP  could  be  introduced  along the 
following lines: White is concerned with identifying the “truly best” forecasting model, and this would match the 
DGP if the latter was simple enough and time invariant over the relevant data sample and forecasting horizon 
(not unlike the local DGP in section 4.4 below). However, this is not a step White (2000) felt compelled to take 
as his focus remained on forecasting performance.  
 
The Reality Check is a systematic approach that protects econometricians from being impressed by spuriously 
accurate forecasts on mined data, such as the example by Sullivan et al. (2001) discussed in the second section. 
Such a procedure could be automated and, indeed, White has suggested a relevant algorithm that combines the 
focus on forecasting with considerations such as flexibility in functional form (allowing for non-linearities and 
interaction  terms),  and  parsimony.  The  algorithm  is  called  Relevant  Transformation  of  the  Inputs  Network 
Approach (RETINA) (White, 1998) and has since become available for wider use (on GAUSS and MATLAB 
platforms) (Perez-Amaral et al., 2003). 
 
The four stages of the RETINA algorithm are discussed extensively in Perez-Amaral, Gallo and White (2005) and  
  17
Castle (2005). Stage 1 entails preliminaries such as data transformation and a three way splitting of the data into 
sub-samples. Stage 2 is a step-wise model search using only data from the first sub-sample, but tested in an out-
of-sample forecast on the second sub-sample. This leads to a preferred model. Stage 3 uses the second sub-
sample to search for a more parsimonious version of the preferred model which will again be tested out-of-
sample against the third sub-sample. Finally in stage 4 the algorithm repeats stages 2 and 3, but with the ordering 
of the sub-samples reversed. The final preferred model will have the best forecast performance over the entire 
sample.  
 
RETINA is a specific-to-general algorithm which selectively adds variables to a model with the goal of good 
forecasting ability within a parsimonious model. As such, it is another inductive approach to data mining; but, in 
contrast with the focus on better communication in the previous method, the emphasis here is on improving out-
of-sample forecasts. It is an appeal to the old “gold standard” of econometric modelling, i.e. forecasting, to show 
that the inevitable data mining yielded a “useful model”. And though it would be possible to find a minor role for 
the DGP in this procedure, that would be step beyond what the proponents of the procedure feel comfortable to 
take; note, for example, how Perez-Amaral, Gallo and White describe RETINA’s goal: “Identify a parsimonious 
set of (transformed) attributes likely to relevant for predicting out-of-sample” (2005: 266). 
  
4.3 A Third inductive response: automated model selection with PIC 
 
Peter Phillips and Werner Ploberger (for example, Phillips, 1996; Phillips and Ploberger, 1996; Ploberger and 
Phillips, 2003) have developed a third inductive approach to data based model selection which allowed them also 
to create an automated data-based modelling algorithm. The DGP takes an even more central role here, as a 
regulative idea22, even if the goal of the modelling exercise is not to uncover the DGP. 
 
The statistical foundations for Phillips and Ploberger’s approach is the earlier work on stochastic complexity by 
Rissanen (especially, Rissanen, 1986; 1987). Building on these foundations, Phillips and Ploberger are able to 
provide a useful (and consistent) modelling strategy as well an epistemological critique of what econometricians 
can hope to achieve given that “…the true model for any given data is unknown and, in all practical cases 
unknowable” (Phillips, 2003: C26).  
 
Their agnosticism about the DGP is a tempered version of Rissanen’s radical empiricism, about which he leaves 
little doubt in the reader’s mind when he expresses the wish to “… remove the untenable assumption of data 
generating systems and ‘true’ parameters, we instead regard the class of models to provide a language in which to 
express the regular features in the data”23 (Rissanen, 1986: 1080). Phillips (1996) used this last extract from 
Rissanen (1986) to introduce his ideas on the DGP, and he has often referred favourably to the concept of a 
model providing a “language in which to express the regular features of the data” (Phillips, 1996: 766; 2003: C39) 
.  
                                                       
22 Even though this procedure is not intended to uncover the DGP, the merit of any particular model is defined relative to 
the “unattainable” DGP.  
23 Rissanen expresses the same ideas elsewhere, for example: “In our general philosophy of modelling there are no data 
generating probabilistic systems nor “true” parameter values” (Rissanen, 1986: 1092).   
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But Phillips and Ploberger do not follow Rissanen all the way to an ontological rejection of the DGP. In contrast, 
they  use  the  DGP  to  derive  limiting  theorems  for  the  ambitions  of  econometric  modelling  that  determine 
“quantitative bounds” or “limits” to how close an actual econometric model can approach the DGP (also called 
the “proximity bound”). However they attribute the theorem which proves this proximity bond to Rissanen24. 
This limit is a positive function of the number of parameters in the initial model and a function of the nature of 
the data. Where the latter is concerned Phillips and Ploberger derived the important result that the proximity 
bound is wider for trending data, i.e. it is harder to find good models for trending data (Ploberger and Phillips, 
2003).  
 
The relevance of this theorem for data mining lies in the result that even with infinite data, a model cannot cross 
over the proximity bound; model uncertainty is not just a small sample problem in this conceptualisation. In 
contrast, Pagan and Veall (2000) argued that the risks of data mining were largely small sample problems and, 
more strongly, Hoover and Perez (1999) and authors in the G-S tradition such as Hendry and Krolzig (for 
example, Hendry and Krolzig, 1999) have used White’s theorem to argue that their data mining algorithm would, 
asymptotically, uncover the DGP with a probability of one.  
 
Phillips and Ploberger’s large sample result – that the model can reach but not cross the proximity bound for any 
given DGP – implies the need for a “yardstick” with which to measure rival models in finite samples. To this end 
they  introduced  a  Bayesian  information  criterion,  called  the  Posterior  Information  Criterion  (or  PIC)  with 
attractive small and large sample properties; for example, it attains the proximity bound asymptotically (Ploberger 
and Phillips, 2003).  
 
The posterior information criterion could be used to guide the iterative model selection strategies associated with 
data mining. Indeed Phillips and Ploberger were also pioneers in the field of automated model selection with the 
purpose of building good forecasting models, or what they have called “data based automation” (Phillips, 2005: 
15). Their data based automation uses the PIC to help the econometrician with difficult, but important decisions, 
such as the selection of an appropriate lag length, the inclusion or otherwise of an intercept, the specification of a 
trend and the inclusion and timing of structural breaks (Phillips, 1995b). A very exciting prospect with this 
algorithm is its potential for offering a wed-based interface which would allow modellers to access the main 
algorithm via the internet (Phillips, 2005).   
 
In addition to its use as a model selection criterion, the PIC has also been extended for purposes of comparing 
rival  forecasting models,  in which case  it is  called the forecast-encompassing PIC criterion  (PICF) (Phillips, 
                                                       
24 Philips and Ploberger define the “distance” between the model and the underlying DGP in terms of the Kullback-Leibler 
(KL) distance. The DGP therefore plays a role in their conception of the limit to econometric modelling. Such a conception 
has no meaning in Rissanen’s more radical empiricism, despite Phillips’s (2003: c40) claim that Rissanen has “asked how 
close on average (measured in terms of Kullback-Leibler distance) can we get to a true dgp using observed data”. Rissanen’s 
rejection of the KL distance is clear from the following: “The same is true about many other well-know model-selection 
criteria such as the AIC, where the objective is to estimate either a mean prediction error or the Kullback distance, both of 
which involve the expectation relative to an imagined and non existing “true” distribution” (Rissanen, 1987: 224).  
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1995b). Since the PICF is automatically available for each model specified in this way, it is also possible to 
combine the forecasts of various models by weighting their various forecast by their posterior likelihoods. This 
method Is not only theoretically attractive, as Phillips has used it with encouraging effect in applications on two 
well-known data sets in the macroeconometric literature (Phillips, 1995b; a).  
 
Using an information criterion such as PIC as a model selection criterion is precisely how Granger, King and 
White (1995) suggested the risk of unwarranted data mining might be diminished. They preferred an inductive 
model selection criterion based on a metric that measures the gap between the model and the DGP, to the 
deductive model selection criterion based on the theory of reduction which is the topic of the next sub-section 
and which is built around a set of criteria for an empirical counterpart to the (local) DGP. 
 
4.4. A deductive response: Probabilistic reduction  
 
In the course of twenty-five years the G-S method (also called the LSE method, or sometimes the Hendry 
method) has risen to take a leading place amongst the rival methods for econometric modelling25. It is a tradition 
often associated with the London School of Economics, especially with David Hendry (though lately at Oxford), 
and collaborators. The core theoretical contribution of this method is the use of probabilistic reduction theory as 
a framework for empirical modelling, a theory which conceives of the entire modelling process as a series of 
reductions  from  the  “unknown  high-dimensional  distribution”  which  is  called  the  Data  Generating  Process 
(DGP), or alternatively the Haavelmo distribution (1989; 2005b). While probabilistic reduction theory is abstract, 
the G-S modelling approach is a practical “analogue” or “embodiment” thereof and designed to facilitate data-
based econometric modelling (Campos et al., 2005b: 15). 
 
The high dimensionality of the DGP implies that no econometric model could be its empirical counterpart, a 
view  also shared  the  three  alternative  approaches  to data-based  modelling  discussed  above.  The  differences 
between these approaches lie in the next step: while some discard the idea of the DGP, others decide to focus on 
forecasting and others again try to approach the unattainable DGP.  
 
In contrast with those approaches the G-S literature introduces a new concept to the debate, the local DGP 
(LDGP): latter represents a valid reduction of the DGP and is a smaller probabilistic model (a well behaved 
Haavelmo distribution) showing the parameters of the interest for the project at hand. Defining the parameters of 
interest for a particular project is, in fact, the first of ten steps in the reduction sequence. It is followed by: data 
transformations and aggregation; sequential factorisation; data partition; marginalization; mapping to stationarity; 
conditional factorization; constancy; lag truncation and functional form (Campos et al., 2005b). A valid reduction 
path from the true DGP to a “well behaved” LDGP entails no loss of information.  
 
The econometric model will be a postulated empirical counterpart to this LDGP, and it is connected via the valid 
                                                       
25 For early surveys see Pagan (1987) and Gilbert (1986), and more recently Campos, Ericsson and Hendry (2005b). Leading 
texts include Hendry (1995) and Spanos (1986; 1999) and a recent compendium of critical papers in the development of this 
method has appeared under the editorship of Campos, Ericsson and Hendry (2005a).  
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steps of reduction with the DGP itself. Once the LDGP has been conceptualised, the implementation of G-S 
starts with an overparameterised general model (generalised unrestricted model or GUM) which is conjectured to 
nest the LDGP.  
 
The next step is crucial in the G-S logic, and it is also the critical point where the G-S method dispels concerns 
with unwarranted data mining (see below). This critical step is to determine whether the GUM provides an 
statistically adequate approximation to the LDGP, i.e. whether the GUM is a congruent description of the LDGP 
in Hendry’s terms (Hendry, 1995). A dominant (or encompassing) congruent model is one that accounts for the 
information in (i) the relative past; (ii) the relative present; (iii) the relative future; (iv) information from economic 
theory, which helps to define the parameters of interest; (v) information about measurements; (vi) information in 
rival models (again subdivided by relative past, present and future) (Hendry, 1995)26.  
 
A  battery  of  mis-specification  tests  are  used  to  establish  the  congruency  of  the  GUM,  and  if  the GUM  is 
congruent, a series of simplifications are implemented to uncover a parsimonious econometric model without 
unacceptable loss of information. Each simplification is tested for a loss of information, and whether it leaves the 
simplified model congruent with the LDGP. These simplifications proceed deductively as a series of restrictions 
on the GUM which is now treated as congruent with the LDGP. This series of deductive tests and the deductive 
reduction of the DGP to the LDGP explains why the G-S method is categorised as a deductive in this paper and 
contrasted with the various inductive approaches considered above.   
 
Critics have raised a number of objections to G-S modelling, and the following paragraphs consider those that are 
relevant to data mining: first, the layers of testing in this explicitly iterative modelling strategy has exposed the G-
S method to the suspicion of unwarranted data mining (Keuzenkamp, 1995; Faust and Whiteman, 1997b; a). 
Proponents  of  the  G-S  method  have  answered  these  concerns  by,  first,  distinguishing  “warranted”  from 
“unwarranted”  data  mining  (Spanos,  2000)  or  “constructive”  from  “pejorative”  data  mining  (Campos  and 
Ericsson, 1999) and, second, arguing that the data mining in G-S is “warranted” or “constructive”.   
 
For example, Spanos (2000) argues that a G-S strategy uses the battery of mis-specification tests only once for a 
postulated GUM after which the GUM is either judged to be congruent, or rejected. Failed mis-specification tests 
are not treated constructively and are not used to redesign the GUM so as to immunise the GUM against a given 
test, a step that would have introduced concerns over the respecification bias (discussed above). Instead a rejected 
GUM is discarded and the econometrician is required to rethink the LDGP before formulating another estimable 
GUM (Spanos, 2000).   
 
Second, Hoover and Perez (1999) raised the possibility that simplification of a congruent model might be path 
dependent.  In  principle  the  various  end-point  models  could  be  tested  for  encompassing,  but  given  the 
                                                       
26 As mentioned above Granger et al. (1995) preferred a model selection criterion based on a distance measure to the 
benchmark approach in the G-S approach, because they considered it problematic to select an particular set of qualifying 
criteria. It might be difficult to convince others that these are reasonable criteria. This line of criticism is countered, in the G-
S literature, by building a case for the congruency criteria.  
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tremendous labour involved in tracing even a single path given a fairly general GUM, this rarely happens in 
practice.  
 
Third, the G-S method might lead to over-fitting, by including variables which are opportunistically present in the 
GUM. And, finally, since the simplifications are performed iteratively on the same data set, the test statistics and 
especially the size of the tests cannot be interpreted in the standard fashion. Hoover and Perez (1999: 169) call 
the G-S test statistics ‘Darwinian’, i.e. “the tests statistics for any specification that has survived such a process [of 
reduction] are necessarily going to be ‘significant’. They are ‘Darwinian’ in the sense that only the fittest survive”. 
There is uncertainty over the size of such “Darwinian” test statistics.  
 
This last criticism has been answered in theory and the last three in practice. First, where theory is concerned the 
proponents of the G-S method have appealed to a theorem by Halbert White (2005 [1990]) on the asymptotic 
size and power of a specification-based model selection procedure such as G-S. White (2005 [1990]) shows that a 
general model that encompasses the LDGP will recover that DGP, with zero type I and II errors as the sample 
grows to infinity, a result that turns the table on the criticism of Darwinian test statistics. Hoover and Perez 
(1999) summarised this remarkable result: 
 
“The critics fear that the survivor of sequential tests survives accidentally and, therefore, that the critical 
values  of  such  tests  ought  to  be  adjusted  to  reflect  the  likelihood of  an  accident.  White’s  theorem 
suggests that the true specification survives precisely because the true specification is necessarily, in the 
long run, the fittest specification” (Hoover and Perez, 1999: 170). 
 
White’s  theorem provides  theoretical  encouragement to  a strategy  based on  a (probably)  over-parameterised 
unrestricted model as starting point. But it also seems to contradict the theorem by Rissanen which Ploberger and 
Phillips used to derive a “proximity bound” between the an over-parameterised starting point and the DGP, a 
bound which not cannot be crossed even as the sample size grows to infinity.  
 
This contradiction between the theorems of White and Rissanen is striking and it is surprising that it has not 
attracted much discussion on either side of the literature. The contradiction arises because of the following 
assumptions by White (and the G-S authors) which are rejected by Rissanen (and Phillips and Ploberger). White 
and  G-S  authors  assume  that  an  econometric  model  could,  in  principal,  nest  the  DGP,  while  Phillips  and 
Ploberger reject the possibility of such nesting and Rissanen rejects the idea of a DGP. As mentioned, the local 
DGP concept is critical for the G-S approach and now we see why: it is the reduction from the high dimensional 
DGP to the relevant LDGP that facilitates both an specification-based strategy such as G-S and the applicability 
of White’s theorem. The theoretical inconsistency between the ambitions of PIC and G-S originates in the theory 
of reduction.  
 
However, using the theory of reduction and White’s theorem to answer the theoretical concerns over Darwinian 
test statistics leaves unanswered the practical concerns about finite sample properties. To investigate this practical  
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question Hoover and Perez (1999) translated the G-S method to an algorithm and automated the procedure on a 
computer.  This allowed them to use Lovell’s  (1983) famous Monte Carlo set-up to test the ability of G-S to 
discover the known DGP in Lovell’s  (1983) artificial economy. They could also evaluate the practical relevance 
of the following three criticisms of G-S: path dependency, over-fitting and unknown test size. 
 
Hoover and Perez’s (1999) results were encouraging; in contrast with the model selection criteria studied by 
Lovell (1983), the automated G-S algorithm recovered the DGP with considerable (though not nearly universal) 
success and the size and power t-test statistics in the final models were not much distorted by the iterative testing 
of  the  G-S  procedure.  Hendry  and  Krolzig  (1999)  responded  to  Hoover  and  Perez’s  (1999)  simulation  by 
introducing an automated G-S algorithm of their own, called PcGets (Hendry and Krolzig, 2001), with which they 
were able to improve on Hoover and Perez’s (1999) results. The data from Baba, Hendry and Starr (1992) (a 
widely known earlier paper in the G-S literature) served as real world test for PcGets, and again the results were 
highly encouraging, with a final specification close to  Baba et al.’s (1992), but reached within seconds instead of 
weeks or even months. From Hendry and Krolzig’s perspective, a considerable merit of this powerful search 
algorithm is precisely that it affords the econometrician greater time and resources to “improving the theory, data 
measurement and econometric specification underpinning the GUM” (Hendry and Krolzig, 2004: 800).  
 
In the G-S tradition, as in the other three traditions discussed above, recent advance in automated modelling have 
generated powerful tools, that save time and search costs, and that should free more resources for the part of 
modelling where econometricians add more value. Though the automated G-S algorithms imply large numbers of 
iterative tests, there is no evidence yet, in theory or practice, that they expose the modeller to larger risks of 
unwarranted data mining. 
 
5. Data mining races 
 
The  relatively  easy  access  to  the  newly  developed  automated  modelling  algorithms  have  encouraged 
econometricians to pit them against each other in what may be described as “data mining races”. Recent examples 
include: Hoover and Perez (2004), Hendry and Krolzig (2004), Castle (2005), Perez-Amoral, Gallo and White 
(2005). There  is a  sense  in which  this  seems an  obvious empirical test of the claims made for the various 
responses to the risk of unwarranted data mining. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and with the 
automated versions of the implied algorithms readily available, the case for empirical trials seems compelling.  
 
A typical example in this literature is Hoover and Perez’s (2004) simulation based on Levine and Renelt (1992) 
cross-country growth data set as the testing ground for two versions of Leamer’s extreme-bounds analysis – those 
of Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) – on the one hand and their own automated version of the 
G-S method on the other. They also run Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) method against their own G-S algorithm on Sala-i-
Martin’s (1997) original data set.  
 
Hoover and Perez (2004) are well aware that the extreme-bounds approaches entails no concept of the DGP as a  
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goal of the modelling exercise. Since they don’t see any merit in the radical subjectivism of Leamer and others27 
they construct their data mining race as if this method was aimed at uncovering the true DGP. In contrast the G-
S method, which is the second competitor in their race, proceeds deductively once the modeller is satisfied on 
statistical grounds that her general model is congruent with the local DGP.  
 
Hoover and Perez’s (2004) results amplify the favourable evaluation of G-S in Hoover and Perez (1999), and this 
against two versions of extreme bounds analysis: Levine and Renelt’s (1992) method is discovered to be too strict, 
as  it  eliminates  many  true  variables,  while  Sala-i-Martin’s  (1997)  is  not  strict  enough,  allowing  too  many 
opportunistic variables in the final specification. In contrast, the G-S method is “just right” in terms of both test 
size and power (Hoover and Perez, 2004: 790); a result confirmed by Hendry and Krolzig (2004) using their 
PcGets algorithm (Hendry and Krolzig, 2001). 
 
While demonstrating  the  merit of the  G-S  approach  with  cross-section  data  adds  important  information  to 
Hoover and Perez’s earlier demonstrations in the time series context (Hendry and Krolzig, 1999; Hoover and 
Perez,  1999),  it  is  less  clear  we  can  learn  from  this  race  and  the  “future  horse  races  against  other  search 
methodologies” which they eagerly anticipate (Hoover and Perez, 2004: 790). The failures of extreme bounds 
analysis in their tests are not relative to successes that Leamer or other proponents of these methods seek. This 
same conclusion would have followed a discussion of most papers in this literature. The research question in such 
a data mining races is not well defined.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Tinbergen and the other pioneers of modern econometrics already encountered the central features of our subject 
matter – model uncertainty and nonexperimental data – which opens the door to unwarranted data mining. And 
despite  the  pious  intentions  of  Tinbergen’s  generation  the  culture  of  repetition  and  criticism  of  applied 
econometrics has flourished only modestly. Though the critical discussion in academic journals and competition 
in the market for econometric output, there is little evidence of vibrant competition et least where the journals are 
concerned.  
 
But new hope springs from a number of exiting developments in the theory of economic modelling: this paper 
surveyed four of these developments ranging from a radically subjective inductivism to an objective and structural 
and deductivism.  
 
The subjectivist approach, associated  especially with  the work of Edward  Leamer, regards data mining  as  a 
problem of communications in economic research and the proposed solution (EBA) is designed to expose the 
fragility  of  empirical  results  in  econometrics.  In  contrast,  Hall  White’s  “Reality  Check”  and  the  RETINA 
algorithm deal with the risks of data mining by adjusting test for all possible rival models and by using the “gold 
standard” of econometrics, new data, to test a model.  
                                                       
27 Elsewhere, Hoover and Perez found Leamer’s position on the DGP  “barely coherent” (Hoover and Perez, 2000: 201).  
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The DGP does not feature in either EBA or RETINA, but moves closer to centre stage in the third approach 
discussed here, Phillips and Ploberger’s PIC. This Bayesian criterion is a yardstick to guide a model search, given 
model uncertainty and non-experimental data. Though the associated modelling strategy does not aim to uncover 
the DGP, it does aim for (and asymptotically reach) the proximity bound of the DGP. In contrast with the other 
approaches,  G-S  is  a  deductive  approach  with  the  explicit  aim  of  encompassing  the  DGP.  The  risks  of 
unwarranted data mining are avoided through the application of the theory of reduction: a once-off round of mis-
specification tests on the general unrestricted model is followed by a series of deductive tests, the validity of 
which is based on the statistical adequacy (congruency) of the GUM. There are no invalid inferences, the tests 
retain their nominal size and consequently there is no risk of unwarranted data mining. G-S, as well as PIC and 
RETINA can  and have  been automated and,  especially the former,  has built an  impressive  track  record of 
applications.  
 
If Keynes sent 70 modern Tinbergen’s into cells with data and laptops they could, following one of the various 
modelling strategies described here, conceivably emerge with similar models. And they would have done so 
rapidly  using  one  of  the  automated  algorithms  mentioned  above.  But  would  they  have  chosen  the  same 
algorithm, and which one is the fittest (if any)?  
 
This question admits of no easy answer: the experience of twenty years and the tremendous gain in computing 
power have introduced powerful tools that will reduce the cost of the slave-work in applied econometrics, but 
they have not reduced the importance of the first step in such a project: the research question.  
 
A project’s goal should still be the overriding factor in determining the appropriate research strategy (Granger, 
1999). Is it forecasting financial variables? Then RETINA looks promising; or perhaps PICF? Is it a structural 
model for aggregate consumption? Then PcGets promises much. And in both cases the initial set-up, including the 
data set, is critical and there is as yet no algorithm to reduce that task. Indeed Hendry has consistently argued that 
these data mining algorithms free the econometrician to labour at that end of the modelling effort where he is 
most able to contribute (for example, Granger and Hendry, 2005).  
 
Amongst  the  decisions  that  the  econometrician  cannot  outsource  to  his  data  mining  algorithm  is  the 
philosophical question of his goal relative to the DGP. This issue turns on deeper questions in ontology and 
epistemology, the problem of induction, and the bridge between theoretical constructs and reality in empirical 
science. And the data mining races of recent vintage between algorithms built on different configurations of 
answers to these questions are regrettably uninformative.  
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